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Abstract. In the contemporary literature Wittgenstein has variously been labelled 
a fideist, a non-cognitivist and a relativist of sorts. The underlying motivation for 
these attributions seems to be the thought that the content of a belief can clearly 
be separated from the attitude taken towards it. Such a  ‘factorization model’ 
which construes religious beliefs as consisting of two independent ‘factors’ – the 
belief ’s content and the belief-attitude – appears to be behind the idea that one 
could, for example, have the religious attitude alone (fideism, non-cognitivism) 
or that religious content will remain broadly unaffected by a  fundamental 
change in attitude (Kusch). In this article I will argue that such a ‘factorization 
model’ severely distorts Wittgenstein’s conception of religious belief.
I.
The myths surrounding Wittgenstein’s conception of religious belief are 
tenacious and enduring. In the contemporary literature, for example, 
Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist (Nielsen 2005), a non-
cognitivist (Hyman 2001, Schröder 2007) and a relativist of sorts (Kusch 
2011). The underlying motivation for many of these attributions seems 
to be the thought that the content of a belief can clearly be separated 
from the attitude taken towards it. Such a  ‘factorization model’ which 
construes religious beliefs as consisting of two independent ‘factors’ – the 
belief ’s content and the belief-attitude – appears to be behind the idea 
that one could, for example, have the religious attitude alone (fideism, 
non-cognitivism) or that religious content will remain broadly unaffected 
by a fundamental change in attitude (Kusch). In the present contribution 
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I  will argue that such a  model faces insuperable philosophical and 
exegetical difficulties, and, consequently, that the conceptions that spring 
from it are mistaken.
II.
Wittgenstein’s conception of religious belief in many ways mirrors his 
philosophical concerns more generally. Just as Wittgenstein rejects the 
idea that philosophy is a  theoretical exercise whose purpose consists 
in developing explanatory hypotheses about the hidden workings of 
language and the world, so, too, he jettisons the thought that Christianity 
offers us a philosophical theory about what goes on in a celestial realm. 
Instead, he shares Kierkegaard’s insight that truth ‘in the sense in which 
Christ is the truth is not a sum of statements, not a definition etc., but 
a life’ (Kierkegaard 1991: 205).
one does not, Wittgenstein believes, come to Christianity through 
argument and intellectual deliberation; it is rather the shape of one’s life 
and experiences that will (or will not) teach one a use for the Christian 
concepts. The exigencies of life may, as it were, thrust these concepts 
upon one. It is for this reason that Wittgenstein says:
It strikes me that a  religious belief could only be something like 
a passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it’s 
belief, it’s really a way of living, or a way of assessing life. It’s passionately 
seizing hold of this interpretation (1977: 64e).
This passage has been subjected to an  enormous amount of 
misinterpretation. So, for example, Wittgenstein is often berated, by 
believers and unbelievers alike, that by emphasizing faith’s ‘existential’ 
dimension  – that is to say, its embeddedness in religious practice  – 
Wittgenstein has thrown out the baby with the bathwater: once all the 
philosophy that is written about Christianity is put aside,1 one would 
seem to be left with nothing more than adherence to a ‘doctrineless’ form 
of life. As Kai Nielsen (2005: 116), for instance, says: ‘The most crucial 
error common to both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein is to argue that 
Christian practice is everything and Christian belief, belief that involves 
doctrines, is nothing.’2 
1 Wittgenstein once wrote: ‘If Christianity is the truth then all the philosophy that is 
written about it is false’ (1977: 83e).
2 Compare also John Hyman (2001) and Severin Schroeder (2007).
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John Hyman takes a similar view. He glosses Wittgenstein’s remark 
in the following way: ‘If a religious belief is something like a passionate 
commitment to a  system of reference  – as opposed to a  passionate 
commitment to the truth of an empirical proposition – then a religious 
belief cannot be true or false. And Wittgenstein held that religious beliefs 
cannot be reasonable or unreasonable either, if that means that they can 
or cannot be justified’ (2001: 6).3
but the matter may be much more complicated than these criticisms 
would suggest. I  have previously argued, for example, that, as in his 
philosophical practice more generally, the point of Wittgenstein’s 
remarks is to challenge the very terms in which the debate is cast. In 
other words, Wittgenstein wants to show that it is itself an  illusion to 
suppose that we are confronted by two exhaustive alternatives here: 
either adherence to a set of metaphysical beliefs (with certain ways of 
acting following from these beliefs) or passionate commitment to a way 
of life; there is no third way.
The thought that there cannot be any middle ground here is fuelled 
by the fact that we are naturally prone to suppose that it is possible 
neatly to separate the meaning of words from their use, and so we might 
be tempted to believe, as many commentators do, that it is possible to 
inspect the words alone in order to find out whether they make sense or 
not. John Cottingham (2009: 209) picturesquely calls such an approach 
applying the ‘fruit juicer’ method to modes of thought of which one 
is sceptical: to require ‘the clear liquid of a  few propositions to be 
extracted for examination in isolation from what [one] take[s] to be the 
irrelevant pulpy mush of context’. It is this tendency, Cottingham argues, 
that Wittgenstein’s emphasis on praxis  – in both religious and other 
contexts – is supposed to preclude.
Stephen mulhall, who criticizes Hyman’s paper in his (2001), 
would concur, arguing that Wittgenstein’s whole approach consists of 
showing that ‘no one can so much as understand what a belief in God’s 
existence amounts to without grasping the location of that concept in 
the grammatical network of religious concepts that Wittgenstein here 
describes as a system of reference’ (mulhall 2001: 101). If this is correct, 
then it makes no sense to think, as Hyman does, that one can first establish 
the truth of the proposition that God exists and then use it as a reason for 
adopting the system of reference. rather, one could not acquire a belief 
3 Compare also Severin Schroeder (2007).
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in God’s existence ‘without both understanding and committing oneself 
to the broader grammatical system in which the concept of God has its 
life’ (ibid.).
martin Kusch has recently followed Nielsen in arguing that this 
kind of conception renders religious language incommensurable4 with 
ordinary discourse: ‘[on this account] Wittgenstein is unable to pick out 
the propositional contents of religious beliefs since he cannot translate 
religious language into his own ... the languages of the believer and the 
non-believer are, in important respects, incommensurable’ (Kusch 2011: 
38). Kusch attributes this view to Cyril barrett and myself:
barrett and Schönbaumsfeld hold that for Wittgenstein religious language 
involves a ‘reorientation’ of ordinary language. moreover, they imply that 
the non-believer can come to grasp the meaning of religious language 
only by converting. And they suggest that the non-believer suffers from 
a kind of conceptual aspect-blindness (Kusch 2011: 39).
In spite of this, Kusch is aware that I do not wish to attribute the incom-
mensurability thesis to Wittgenstein. Quoting from my (2007: 193):
religious discourse cannot ... be ‘self-contained’ or ‘sealed-off ’ from 
other linguistic ‘domains’, for it is precisely the quotidian senses of words 
that make possible the ‘renewed’ uses of applications of these words 
in religious contexts. In this respect, religious discourse, like artistic 
language-use, involves an  extension or transformation of everyday 
discourse and consequently can’t be ‘incommensurable’ with it.
Nevertheless, Kusch (2011: 40) claims to be unconvinced by this 
response for the following reasons. Firstly, he thinks that the fact that 
religious discourse ‘renews’ ordinary words does not establish that this 
discourse is translatable into those words. Secondly, Kusch contends that 
if God’s intervention is needed to give the religious believer ‘almost new 
words’, then what – short of a conversion – can enable the non-believer 
to understand these words? Finally, Kusch believes that the parallel that 
I draw between artistic and religious language-use cannot demonstrate 
commensurability, since grasping religious discourse for the first 
time seems to amount to a  fundamental change in form of life, while 
understanding an artistic metaphor does not. In the next sections, I will 
respond to Kusch’s critique of my conception and raise some worries for 
his alternative view.
4 In my (2007) I show that Nielsen’s objection misfires (see pp. 191-6).
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III.
I  argued previously that in order to grasp the sense of religious 
expressions, one not only needs to understand what the ‘atoms’– that is, 
the individual words comprising the utterance – mean in other contexts 
(in contexts, say, in which one has first learnt the uses of these words), 
but what the sentence as a whole means, and this can only be done if 
one understands how the words are functioning in this specific context; 
one must, as it were, understand their technique of application here. This 
is why Wittgenstein says in the Lectures on Religious Belief (1966: 55) 
that in one sense he understands all the religious person who believes 
in a  last Judgement says, because he understands, for example, the 
ordinary words ‘God’ or ‘separate’,5 but that, in another sense, he doesn’t 
understand the sentence at all for, in this particular context, he has no 
grasp of how these familiar words are used: ‘my normal technique of 
language leaves me’ (ibid.).
Does this imply, as Kusch (2011: 40) seems to believe, that religious 
language is therefore incommensurable with other forms of discourse? 
No. The reasons for this are as follows. one cannot, for example, explain 
what ‘God’s eye sees everything’ means to someone who does not 
understand the habitual senses of the words comprising the sentence. 
Neither could one explain what ‘eye’ means in this context by pointing, 
say, to God’s ‘anatomy’, since it is obvious that the word ‘eye’ in the 
sentence ‘God’s eye sees everything’ is not functioning in the same way 
as the word ‘eye’ does in the sentence ‘a racoon’s eye can see in the dark’. 
It is equally obvious that one could not apply the word ‘eye’ to God, if 
one could not employ the word ‘eye’ in everyday contexts – if, that is, 
one could not understand ‘a racoon’s eye can see in the dark’ and similar 
sentences. So, religious discourse cannot be radically discontinuous with 
ordinary language-use, since it is parasitic upon it.
of course Kusch is right that it does not follow from the fact that 
there cannot be radical discontinuity here, that one is therefore able 
fully to translate religious discourse into another idiom. but I have never 
claimed that this is either possible or necessary. For, arguably, many 
linguistic domains are ‘irreducible’ (not incommensurable!) in this 
5 It is unclear why Wittgenstein speaks of ‘separate’ in connection with a discussion of 
a last Judgement, but I presume he is thinking of sentences such as ‘the soul is separate 
from the body’ or some such thing, but of course this is only a  guess. What exactly 
Wittgenstein meant is irrelevant to our discussion, though.
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way – aesthetic, ethical and even psychological language-uses springing 
immediately to mind. many unsuccessful philosophical attempts have 
been made to ‘translate’ these forms of discourse into another, primarily 
into a kind of ‘language of science’ perhaps.6
To be fair to Kusch, he claims to agree that learning about the 
grammar of religious expressions involves learning about the religious 
form of life. but it is not easy to see how that can be compatible with the 
‘factorization’ model that he espouses.7 For if the grammar of religious 
expressions can only be learnt from their context – that is to say, their 
embeddedness within the religious form of life – then one has to immerse 
oneself in that practice if one is to have any hope of understanding 
religious language. This does not imply, as Kusch mistakenly seems to 
assume, that one actually has to convert in order to be able to learn the 
grammar of religious expressions – for example, one does not have to be 
a religious believer to understand that the depth grammar of the concept 
‘God’ is not akin to that of a super-empirical object (on Wittgenstein’s 
view) – but it does mean that a lot of familiarity with and sensitivity to 
the practices in question is necessary.
Furthermore, there may well be some aspects of religious discourse 
that will continue to remain opaque to one, quite possibly regardless of 
whether one is a religious believer or not. As Wittgenstein says:
In religion every level of devoutness must have its appropriate form of 
expression which has no sense at a  lower level. This doctrine, which 
means something at a higher level, is null and void for someone who 
is still at the lower level; he can only understand it wrongly and so these 
words are not valid for such a person (1977: 32e).
In other words, the greater one’s spiritual development, the more sense 
some religious doctrines might make. but, again, this does not radically 
distinguish religious from other forms of discourse, because it is also 
true in art, ethics and philosophy that the greater one’s abilities and 
understanding, the greater the horizons of significance that will open 
themselves up to one. Indeed, when coming to see or to experience 
something for the first time, one often calls this having an ‘epiphany’ – 
something that seems very close to the conceptual ‘reorientation’ or 
transformation that I speak of in the religious domain. In fact, it seems 
6 one need only think of mackie’s view of ethics here or Churchland’s attempt to 
reduce ‘folk psychology’ to the ‘language’ of neuroscience.
7 For more on this, see the next section.
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very close to how Wittgenstein thinks of his own philosophical activity, 
which he at one time describes as being like the shift from alchemy to 
chemistry.8
So, transitions are fluid here: the basic grammar of religious expressions 
can be learnt by believers and unbelievers alike by attending closely to 
the religious form of life and the use to which religious expressions are 
put in them. but some aspects of religious doctrine and practice may 
remain closed to one if one is not a religious believer. This should not 
be surprising. Actual participants in a practice always have a different 
perspective from outsiders to the practice – it is one thing to learn about 
driving a car, and quite another actually to drive it.
Wittgenstein seems to have this distinction in mind when he says that 
he could only utter the word ‘lord’ with meaning, if he lived completely 
differently:
I read: ‘No man can say that Jesus is the lord, but by the Holy Ghost.’ – 
And it is true: I cannot call him Lord; because that says nothing to me. 
I could call him the ‘paragon’, ‘God’ even – or rather, I can understand it 
when he is called thus; but I cannot utter the word ‘lord’ with meaning. 
Because I  do not believe that he will come to judge me; because that 
says nothing to me. And it could say something to me, only if I  lived 
completely differently (1977: 33e).
What Wittgenstein is saying here is that some religious expressions can 
be understood even if one doesn’t share the perspective of the believer, 
while others will remain opaque or meaningless if one is not a participant 
in the religious form of life, and hence lives ‘completely differently’. This 
already gives a  fairly clear indication that Wittgenstein would reject 
a  ‘factorization’ model of religious belief, for the significance of this 
passage precisely consists in bringing out that the meaning of religious 
contents is not independent of one’s ‘belief-attitude’, which, in turn, 
cannot be specified independently of the way in which one lives one’s life.
IV.
on Kusch’s alternative conception, on the other hand, a distinction can 
be drawn between what he calls ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’ belief-
attitudes that are directed towards the same propositional content:
8 Quoted in monk (1991: 298).
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ordinary belief-attitudes are found in empirical and scientific beliefs; 
extraordinary belief-attitudes are characteristic of religious beliefs. [The 
Lectures on Religious Belief allow] that one and the same proposition – for 
instance, that there will be a Last Judgement – can serve as a propositional 
content for both an  extraordinary and for an  ordinary belief-attitude 
(Kusch 2011: 37).
Kusch claims that ‘ordinary’ beliefs have the following five features. 
1. They tend to be described as ‘opinions’, ‘views’ or ‘hypotheses’. 2. They 
are more or less reasonable; more or less well supported by evidence. 
3. They are candidates for knowledge. 4. ‘I am not sure’ or ‘possibly’ are 
often someone else’s responses to a profession of such beliefs. 5. They 
don’t normally have the power to change our lives. ‘extraordinary’ 
beliefs, on the other hand, differ in all these respects:
‘Faith’ and ‘dogma’ rather than ‘opinion’ and ‘hypothesis’ are the non-
technical terms commonly used for extraordinary beliefs; extraordinary 
beliefs are not on the scale of being confirmed or falsified by empirical 
evidence; although ‘extraordinary’ beliefs are the ‘firmest’ of all beliefs, 
they are not candidates for knowledge; they are tied to strong emotions 
and pictures; they guide people’s life; and their expression can be the 
culmination of a form of life (Kusch 2011: 38).
For example, the person holding an  ‘ordinary’ belief that God exists 
takes the same attitude towards the belief ’s propositional content as he 
would towards an ordinary empirical prediction – i.e. he will regard it 
as more or less probable or as more or less well-supported by evidence – 
whereas the person holding an ‘extraordinary’ belief that God exists has 
a completely different, entirely ‘firm’, attitude not grounded in empirical 
evidence at all (Kusch 2011: 38; 2012: 12).
It is hard to see how this can be right. For, among other things, it is 
difficult to square with the central Wittgensteinian notion that meaning 
is use and that practice gives words their sense. Compare, for example, 
the following remarks:
Actually I should like to say that ... the words you utter or what you think 
as you utter them are not what matters, so much as the difference they 
make at various points in your life. How do I know that two people mean 
the same when each says he believes in God? ... Practice gives the words 
their sense (1977: 85e).
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For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the 
word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in 
the language (1953: §43).
If Wittgenstein is right, one struggles to make sense of the idea that 
the attitude one takes towards a  belief makes no (or little) difference 
to the belief ’s propositional content. For taking an  ‘ordinary’ belief-
attitude towards the proposition that God exists seems to have obvious 
implications for what ‘God exists’ means. So, for instance, the person 
who, like Wittgenstein’s Father o’Hara from the Lectures on Religious 
Belief, thinks that there is ‘scientific’ evidence for the existence of God, and 
consequently, in Kusch’s parlance, has an ‘ordinary’ belief-attitude, will 
take the proposition that God exists to be a claim about a super-empirical 
object, while for Wittgenstein this is a misguided way of thinking about 
God. As Wittgenstein says in Culture and Value: ‘The way you use the 
word “God” does not show whom you mean  – but, rather, what you 
mean’ (1977: 50e). on Wittgenstein’s conception, in other words, ‘God’ 
does not denote some thing that one could encounter independently of 
having the concept in the sense that one could encounter a unicorn or 
the loch Ness monster, say, if there happened to be such things. That 
is to say, Wittgenstein believes that while the surface grammar of the 
word ‘God’ functions in many ways analogously to that of an outlandish 
person, its depth grammar is actually quite different. This is shown, for 
example, by the fact that one cannot ‘overhear’ God talking to someone 
else – something that religious believers do not explain by reference to 
God’s either being mute or out of earshot. but, if this is right, it seems that 
Father o’Hara and Wittgenstein’s religious believer cannot, pace Kusch, 
believe the same things. For Father o’Hara believes that ‘God’ denotes 
a  super-powerful entity for which there can be scientific evidence, 
whereas Wittgenstein’s religious believer thinks it does not make sense to 
conceive of God in this way. A fortiori the propositional content of their 
respective beliefs must be different, even if o’Hara and Wittgenstein’s 
religious believer use the same words to describe their beliefs.
If this is correct, then ‘content’ and ‘attitude’ cannot be divorced 
from each other in the way that the ‘factorization’ model requires. And 
this, in turn, means that understanding religious discourse is not as 
straightforward as one might, perhaps, at first imagine. For if belief-
attitude and content are not distinct ‘factors’, it cannot be taken for granted 
that the religious believer and the atheist will be able to understand each 
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other simply in virtue of using the same words. As Wittgenstein says in 
the Lectures on Religious Belief:
If you ask me whether or not I believe in a Judgement Day, in the sense 
in which religious people have a belief in it, I wouldn’t say, ‘No. I don’t 
believe there will be such a thing. It would seem to me utterly crazy to say 
this.’ And then I give an explanation: ‘I don’t believe in ... ’, but then the 
religious person never believes what I describe (1966: 55, emphasis added).
If this is right, no clear distinction can be drawn between ‘living in 
a  certain way’ and ‘believing certain things’, as genuine beliefs can 
never be divorced from and understood completely independently of 
the difference they make in one’s life. So, Wittgenstein would reject the 
idea that beliefs are composed of two independent ‘factors’ – the belief ’s 
content and the belief-attitude. rather, for Wittgenstein, ‘content’ and 
‘attitude’ are mutually interdependent, since it is not possible to make 
sense of one without the other.
This also helps one to see why, pace Hyman and Nielsen, Wittgenstein 
cannot be a non-cognitivist who seeks to reduce the content of religious 
beliefs to the expression of emotional attitudes. For if one cannot ‘factor 
out’ the attitude from the content, neither can one reduce one to the 
other. When Wittgenstein, therefore, says, for example, that ‘Christianity 
is not a doctrine, not, I mean, a theory about what has happened and will 
happen to the human soul, but a description of something that actually 
takes place in human life’ (1977: 28e), he does not thereby mean that 
Christianity has no cognitive content. rather, what he is suggesting 
is that being able, say, to recite the Creeds or Catholic dogma is not 
sufficient for having a proper understanding of religious concepts, as this 
requires being able to see religious utterances non-instrumentally, that 
is to say, it requires being able to see their point and aptness rather than 
their ability, as it were, to convey ‘information’ about God. And being 
able to see this is not possible, if Wittgenstein is right, independently 
of having some familiarity and grasp of the Christian form of life and 
the phenomenology of experience that gave rise to it. Hence, when 
Wittgenstein says that the important thing with regard to the Christian 
‘doctrine’ is to understand ‘that you have to change your life’ or ‘the 
direction of your life’,9 he is not implying that it is somehow possible to 
9 ‘I  believe that one of the things Christianity says is that sound doctrines are all 
useless. That you have to change your life. (or the direction of your life.) ... The point is 
that a sound doctrine need not take hold of you; you can follow it as you would a doctor’s 
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do this without committing oneself to the Christian claims. For to say 
that much more than rote-reciting is required, is not to say that therefore 
the ‘doctrine’ – the Christian claims – are irrelevant, as this would be as 
absurd as thinking that because a song can be sung both with and without 
expression, one could have the expression without the song (1966: 29).
Consequently, it is not the case, as is often supposed, that Wittgenstein 
denies that religious people believe different things to non-religious 
people. What he is denying is that any sense can be made of what those 
things are independently of paying attention to the form of life (or 
practice) which gives them sense.
V.
It is an upshot of Kusch’s view that a criticism, on the basis of shared 
standards, of the very adoption of extraordinary standards, is ruled out. 
Following bernard Williams, Kusch calls this a  ‘relativism of distance’ 
(2011: 52). A  ‘relativism of distance’ implies that ‘disagreements’ 
between people who hold extraordinary beliefs and those that do not, 
can be ‘faultless’. I agree that there can be ‘faultless difference’ between 
religious believers and those who lack religious attitudes, but I think it is 
misleading to call this a form of relativism.
The reason why I would prefer to talk of ‘faultless difference’ rather 
than ‘faultless disagreement’ is of course that, contrary to Kusch, I do 
not think that the content of ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’ beliefs is the 
same. Consequently, believer and unbeliever do not necessarily have 
a ‘disagreement’ at all, for this presupposes that one can deny what the 
other affirms. but if, as I have argued, one first has to learn the grammar 
of religious beliefs before one can have disputes about them with the 
believer, then one cannot criticize religious beliefs by inspecting the 
words, or the putative ‘propositional’ content, alone. rather, what 
Wittgenstein’s view entails is that in order for disagreement to be possible, 
a shared common background must first be acquired that enables one to 
understand what, exactly, it is that the other is committed to. Without 
this being in place, one would not be able to contradict what the religious 
person says:
prescription.  – but here you need something to move you and turn you in a  new 
direction ... once you have been turned round, you must stay turned round. Wisdom is 
passionless. but faith by contrast is what Kierkegaard calls a passion’ (1977: 53e).
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Suppose that someone believed in the last Judgement, and I don’t, does 
this mean that I believe the opposite to him, just that there won’t be such 
a thing? I would say: ‘not at all, or not always’ ... ‘Do you contradict the 
man?’ I’d say: ‘No’ (1966: 53).
on Kusch’s conception, Wittgenstein is not contradicting the religious 
believer, because while the latter has an ‘extraordinary’ belief-attitude to 
the proposition that there will be a last Judgement, Wittgenstein merely 
has the ‘ordinary’, ‘empirical’ belief-attitude towards there not being 
such a thing. Since these belief-attitudes are distinct, there is no conflict 
between what the two parties say. The reason why Kusch is nevertheless 
happy to speak of an  ‘extraordinary’ disagreement here is that even 
though the two parties do not straightforwardly contradict each other 
(since they have different belief-attitudes), they do ‘disagree’ about the 
content of their beliefs (since one of them believes that there will be 
a last Judgement, while the other doesn’t):
To fully appreciate the contingency of having or lacking extraordinary 
beliefs is to recognize that the ‘extraordinary disagreement’ between the 
believer and the unbeliever may well be faultless: neither side need have 
made a mistake. This faultless epistemic peer disagreement is not fully 
reasonable – neither side is able to identify its evidence fully, not even to 
himself or herself. but this disagreement is not altogether unreasonable 
either: each side may well have done its best on the basis of its historically 
contingent sensibility (Kusch 2012: 22).
This is convincing only if one can make sense of the idea of ‘extraordinary’ 
evidence that Kusch invokes earlier on (2012: 14). For prima facie, one 
might wonder why, if ‘extraordinary’ beliefs have exactly the same 
content as ‘ordinary’ beliefs, but are just held more firmly on what seems 
to be flimsier evidence, one should so much as allow ‘extraordinary’ 
beliefs any kind of epistemic credibility. As Wittgenstein says:
They [religious believers] base things on evidence which taken in one 
way would seem exceedingly flimsy. They base enormous things on 
this evidence. Am I to say they are unreasonable? I wouldn’t call them 
unreasonable. I  would say, they are certainly not reasonable, that’s 
obvious (1966: 57-8).
If you compare it [religious belief] with anything in Science which we call 
evidence, you can’t credit that anyone could soberly argue: ‘Well, I had 
this dream ... therefore ... last Judgement.’ You might say: ‘For a blunder, 
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that’s too big.’ If you suddenly wrote numbers down on the blackboard, 
and then said: ‘Now, I’m going to add,’ and then said: ‘2 and 21 is 13’ etc. 
I’d say: ‘This is no blunder’ (1966: 61-2).
What Wittgenstein seems to be saying here is that if one believes that 
religious beliefs are based on ‘evidence’ in the way that scientific beliefs, 
for example, can be said to be based on evidence, then one is either, 
like Father o’Hara,10 cheating oneself, or irrational. For, if one really 
believed that it made sense to argue ‘dream – therefore last Judgement’ 
or ‘miracles – therefore Son of God’, then this is no ordinary mistake – 
that is to say, no simple blunder for which there is a place in the ‘system’. 
Since Wittgenstein, unlike the author of The Golden Bough, for example, 
does not want to come to the conclusion, however, that ‘the whole of 
mankind does all that [i.e. engages in religious practice] out of sheer 
stupidity’,11 he tries to find an alternative explanation: ‘There are cases 
where I’d say he’s mad, or he’s making fun. Then there might be cases 
where I look for an entirely different interpretation altogether’ (1966: 62). 
The ‘entirely different interpretation’ might comprise, for example, 
a refusal to interpret religious beliefs as being in any way analogous to 
scientific beliefs. That is to say, the believer isn’t necessarily mad, but 
might rather be engaged in a different kind of activity: ‘Whether a thing 
is a blunder or not – it is a blunder in a particular system ... You could 
also say that where we are reasonable, they are not reasonable – meaning 
they don’t use reason here’ (1966: 59). but it is a  mistake to think, as 
Kusch does, that adopting such an approach is not going to have serious 
implications for the content of what is believed, but will merely affect 
one’s belief-attitude.
For instance, when Wittgenstein is criticizing Father o’Hara’s 
conception of religious belief, he isn’t merely criticizing his attitude:
Father o’Hara is one of those people who make it a question of science ... 
I  would definitely call o’Hara unreasonable. I  would say, if this is 
religious belief, then it’s all superstition. but I would ridicule it, not by 
saying it is based on insufficient evidence. I  would say: here is a  man 
who is cheating himself. You can say: this man is ridiculous because he 
believes, and bases it on weak reasons (1966: 57-9).
10 Father o’Hara was a professor of physics and mathematics at Heythrop College 
london, who participated in a bbC debate about science and religion in the 1930s.
11 Wittgenstein (1993: 119).
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Wittgenstein is here taking issue with the very idea of trying to make 
Christianity probable. That is to say, Wittgenstein thinks that it is 
‘a  confusion of the spheres’, a kind of category mistake, to speak with 
Kierkegaard,12 to treat a  religious question as if it were a  scientific 
question that could be settled by appeal to empirical evidence. It is this 
confusion that, according to Wittgenstein, turns religious belief into 
mere superstition – that is to say, into a form of false science.
Kusch agrees that Father o’Hara’s religious belief is unreasonable:
Superstition is unreasonable religious belief; in o’Hara’s case it is 
religious belief falling way short of the appropriate extraordinary belief 
attitude ... Put differently, what might be convincing evidence (even 
for the believer) against religious belief taken as ordinary, is not at all 
evidence against extraordinary belief (2012: 13).
The reason why Kusch believes that ‘ordinary’ evidence is not evidence 
against ‘extraordinary’ belief is the following:
Wittgenstein is adamant that one does not develop an  attitude of 
extraordinary belief in response to mere ordinary evidence. Instead, 
it is the course of one’s life as a  whole that either causes one to have 
extraordinary beliefs or causes one not to have them. This cause is not 
a  ‘brute cause’: it does not bring about extraordinary belief in the way 
a hit over the head or a drug might bring about a headache. It is a cause 
in terms of which the religious believer is able to make sense of his 
extraordinary beliefs, at least partially. And hence it seems appropriate 
to speak of this cause as ‘extraordinary evidence’ (2012: 13-4).
I  agree with Kusch that ‘Wittgenstein is adamant that one does not 
develop an attitude of extraordinary belief in response to mere ordinary 
evidence’, but I’m not sure it is appropriate to speak of this cause as 
‘extraordinary evidence’. Consider, for example, the following remark:
life can educate one to a belief in God. And experiences too are what bring 
this about; but I don’t mean visions and other forms of sense experience 
which show us ‘the existence of this being’, but, e.g., sufferings of various 
sorts. These neither show us God in the way a sense impression shows 
us an object, nor do they give rise to conjectures about him. experiences, 
thoughts – life can force this concept on us (1977: 86e).
12 See Kierkegaard (1998: 5).
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If ‘life’ can educate one to a belief in God or ‘force’ this concept upon 
one, is it therefore correct to say that ‘life’ provides ‘extraordinary’ 
evidence for the existence of God? For how, one might wonder, can 
life provide evidence for anything? one might just as well say that life 
provides one with ‘extraordinary evidence’ for animism, the truth of 
scientology, or witches. And if, furthermore, animists, scientologists and 
witch-worshippers can ‘faultlessly’ disagree, then one would have, not 
a ‘relativism of distance’, but rampant relativism.
Kusch himself admits (in an email exchange) that one cannot take 
an extraordinary belief-attitude to just anything – for instance to Wayne 
rooney’s being a fool (Kusch’s example). but, if so, then some criteria are 
needed that allow one to draw a line here, and it is hard to see where they 
might plausibly come from. What is more, it seems that such criteria 
would have to be driven by the content of what is believed, and this 
appears to be in tension with Kusch’s contention that one can take both 
an  ‘ordinary’ and an  ‘extraordinary’ attitude to the same propositional 
content. For if certain contents are, as it were, more ‘extraordinary 
attitude-apt’ than others – which they would have to be if one wants to 
rule out that one can take an extraordinary attitude to ‘just anything’ – 
then all sorts of ‘new’ forms of ‘unreasonable’ belief will become possible. 
For example, one can take up an ‘ordinary’ attitude to something that is, 
in itself, an ‘extraordinary’ proposition, or take an ‘extraordinary’ attitude 
to something that ‘really’ only has empirical content. It is difficult to see 
either how one could make sense of such ‘errors’, or what it might mean 
to ascribe an ‘intrinsic’ content to a proposition. For the latter is clearly 
inconsistent with Wittgenstein’s idea that meaning is use and therefore 
context-dependent.
For these reasons, the better option is to read Wittgenstein as 
rejecting altogether the notion that faith rests on an evidential basis.13 
Does that imply, though, that, on my conception, religious belief is 
utterly groundless? If by ‘groundless’ one means ‘not based on any reasons 
whatsoever’, the answer is ‘no’; if by ‘groundless’ one means that belief in 
God is not ‘evidentially grounded’ in the way that satellite pictures of the 
earth, say, provide evidential grounds for the proposition ‘the earth is 
round’, the answer is ‘yes’. In other words, one’s life experiences might 
give one reason to believe in God, but those reasons are not evidence – 
not even ‘extraordinary’ evidence – for God’s existence. For ‘evidence’ 
13 For more on this point, see my (2007), chapter 4.
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ought to be something that everyone can independently appeal to as 
a justification, but this is not possible in the religious case. For example, 
one cannot extract a general rule from experiences that might motivate 
religious belief – i.e. one cannot reasonably argue that personal suffering 
proves the existence of God or will make one religious. Consequently, 
the overall shape of one’s life might give one (personal) reasons to 
believe in God, but it is misleading to call this a form of ‘evidence’. As 
Wittgenstein says:
unshakable faith. (e.g. in a  promise.) Is it less certain than being 
convinced of a mathematical truth? – (but does that make the language 
games any more alike!) (1977: 84e)
Analogously, one might say: it is possible to employ the phrase 
‘extraordinary’ evidence in the religious context, but that does little 
to make it any more similar to what one ordinarily calls ‘evidence’. 
The language-games are very different here. It is for these reasons that 
Wittgenstein thinks that religious believer and atheist do not necessarily 
have a disagreement at all, but are rather engaged in different activities.
VI.
If what I  have argued in this essay is correct, Kusch’s ‘factorization’ 
model severely distorts Wittgenstein’s conception of religious belief. 
It is possible to make sense of Wittgenstein’s remarks without either 
having to ascribe an ‘incommensurability’ thesis or a form of relativism 
to him. religious grammar can be learnt by the non-believer, but is 
‘irreducible’  – i.e. it cannot be translated into ordinary discourse (or, 
indeed, into a  ‘language of science’) without ‘remainder’. This also 
implies that standard interpretations of Wittgenstein that attribute 
fideism or non-cognitivism to him are wide of the mark. Wittgenstein 
has no wish to do away with religious content and to reduce it to the 
expression of emotional attitudes. Consequently, he is not an expressivist. 
Wittgenstein’s reflections on religious belief are ground-breaking 
precisely because they cannot be pressed into preconceived moulds. 
Hence, wouldn’t it be odd if a philosopher who otherwise challenged the 
philosophical orthodoxy, came no further, in his reflections on religion, 
than the logical Positivists?
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